NATO: The Indispensable Western Alliance by Romão, Rui M. J.
AU/ACSC/ROMAO/AY08 
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
NATO: THE INDISPENSABLE WESTERN ALLIANCE 
 
By 
Rui M. Romao, Major, Portuguese Air Force 
A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 
Advisor: Dr. Mary Hampton 




The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.  In 
accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the 




I am European, my wife is American and our sons are both European and American.  I know 
from experience that my culture is different from the American one.  Although, the European 
and American values, the values we teach our sons are fundamentally the same.  Because 
Americans and Europeans have the same core beliefs, our sons, one day, will be able to live in 
either side of the Atlantic. It will be their choice.  In order for them and many others to have that 
choice available, the West needs to find strategies focused on the future preservation of those 
values.   
This paper brings different historical and political perspectives mainly from the 20th century.  
It also brings current examples to validate the importance of preserving the West core democratic 
values.  The preservation of these values is fundamental, so future generations have the 
opportunity to live in a free world where they can make their own choices.  This is why it is 
important to read this paper.  It presents the American and European values, today’s global 
insecurity dilemma and possible ways for the West to preserve its beliefs.  
I want to extend my appreciation to Dr. Mary Hampton, my advisor, for motivating me to 
pursuit this subject so many times discussed before.  The difference in this particular discussion - 
that she pointed out – is that the reasons that seem to be dividing the West, more than material 
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NATO is the indispensable Alliance to the preservation of the western values.  It is a tool 
capable of creating a bridge between American and European interests and identities and without 
it, the western stability will grow weaker.  The Allies are different to a certain extent, although 
their cultural foundations are based on the same core democratic values and beliefs.  Due to their 
geography, history, nationalism/ethnicity, development and religion, they came to develop 
different external behaviors.  More than values, policies are what most divide the West.  
Globalization, the victory over communism, a technology driven revolution in military affairs, 
the chance of spreading a model of society thru the internet and modern communication systems, 
all allowed the rise of political awareness, envy and resentment against the West.  The global 
turmoil the world is facing is a compound of security problems. Their implications can be 
devastating to the West.  The first two possible solutions for the preservation of the Western 
Values are the creation of ad hoc coalitions and a complete separation in the European and 
American Military.  Both solutions are not legitimate, do not defend collective security, nor 
defend the preservation of the Western Values.  A third solution indicates what the Allies need to 
do.  A different North-Atlantic Alliance, projected for the 21st, century where both Allies assume 
their responsibilities.  Europe assumes its full political and economic responsibility and America 
compromises its freedom of action towards effective institutionalism, in favor of global 




“The world is now politically awakened to the inequality on the human condition.”1 
 
Globalization, technology and the spread of information allowed a worldwide political 
awareness.  As the world social economical asymmetries became clear, the world resentment 
grew against the West.  On September 11, 2001, people all over the world awoke to a cruel and 
terrible reality.  Total national security and security given by natural geographic isolation both 
belong to the past.  The possibility of striking societies with catastrophic consequences became 
accessible not only to preeminent world powers, but also to isolated groups, virtually separated 
from their state and without the moral and legal constrains of the civilized world.  In the 
awakening of this post Cold War global turmoil, how can man preserve his freedom, his right to 
life or pursuit of happiness?  What exactly is the world, and in particular, the Western World 
facing today?  Will the West be able to overcome some extrinsic differences and preserve its 
values and beliefs as they are today, or will it have to adjust to this new reality? This paper 
defends that NATO is the indispensable Alliance to the preservation of the western values, since 
it is a tool capable of creating a bridge between American and European interests and identities 
and without it, the western stability will grow weaker. 
The first chapter focuses on the values and beliefs that characterize Americans and 
Europeans.  Such focus starts by describing what the West in reality means, then analyzes the 
American and European identities and it ends by presenting some of the differences and 
similarities between Americans and Europeans.  The second chapter presents the security 
dilemma the world is facing today.  It starts with a reference to the effects of the American 
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hegemony, it follows relating globalization, economic asymmetry and political awareness with 
the rise of global turmoil.  It concludes explaining what exactly are the new challenges and 
threats to global security and what implications they have to the West.  The third chapter 
analyzes the solution that best protects what the West represents.  It starts with the definition of 
the criteria that will evaluate three possible solutions to the security dilemma.  It then analyzes 
each criterion in three different alternatives the West can use to guarantee its security and 
preserve its values.  At the end, the third chapter describes what the West needs to do in order to 




The Western Values 
1. The Concept of West  
The concept of West, while cultural and political, appeared in the 19th century.  It 
emerged from the Enlightenment ideals of political liberty and universal humanity, expressed in 
the French and American revolutions.2  It gained consistency throughout the 20th century, during 
the two World Wars and the Cold War, in contrast to the ideas of what was non-West, such as 
Nazi Germany, authoritarian Russia, Communist Soviet Union and the Orient.  More than 
anything else, the West emerged as a political alliance between some western powers, such as 
France, Great Britain, and America.3   
2. The American Identity 
The American identity is deep-rooted in core democratic values.  The American 
Constitution defends that all men are created equal, that God gives them certain rights, such as 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.4  The Constitution further states that Government 
derives from the people.  Governments are organized in a certain way and have certain powers 
and responsibilities, like the responsibility to establish safety for the people.5  The core values 
expressed in the American writings and speeches (Declaration of Independence, the United 
States Constitution, Gettysburg Address, the Star Spangled Banner, and the Pledge of 
Allegiance)6 are fundamental beliefs and constitutional principles that unite all Americans.7  
These include beliefs of life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, justice, equality, diversity, truth, 
popular sovereignty, patriotism, and rule of law.   
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Since their inception, Americans developed the idea of exceptionalism alongside 
religious predestination.  Religion and the sense of holy mission were determinant in the way 
America conducted domestic and foreign policies.  America, the “shining city upon a hill,” free 
from religious or political persecution grew under the conviction that God gave her the mission 
to defend these values across the world and defend it from oppression and tyranny.  When 
President Woodrow Wilson led America into the First World War against imperial Germany, he 
had in mind to protect democracy and save civilization.8  In a speech to Congress on April 2, 
1917, Woodrow Wilson defended a safe world for democracy and a peace based on political 
liberty.9  Wilson defended the American involvement in the War, as a way to fulfill God given 
mission and save the World from tyranny.10  The war was justified by the redemptive vision of a 
new world order, based on American ideals and by the fact it would free Europeans from 
autocratic regimes.  President Wilson believed God gave America the divine mission of 
shepherding the world into His kingdom.11   
The idea of exceptionalism continues to influence American Leaders whose speeches and 
policies often reflect it.  In the beginning, it was apparently different.  Americans, contrary to 
their European ancestors were against the idea of war.  War would be a last resort to defend 
freedom and democracy.  Some authors argued that America’s initial aversion to power politics 
and to the use of war was only the result of a position of weakness.12  In his book - Of Paradise 
and Power - Robert Kagan argues that Americans simply defended international law as the best 
way to regulate nation’s behaviors, because they were in a position of weakness in relation to 
European countries like Great Britain or France.  When the European position of dominance 
disappeared after two world wars, it also changed the American way of defending her interests in 
the world.  Although it might seem that America changed with the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
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and 9/11, it did not.  She only became more herself.13  What did change after 1989 and especially 
after 9/11 was not the ideology but the strategy to defend it.  After WWII, the threat of 
communism compelled America to defend her interests well beyond the main land, into the East, 
Middle East, Latin America and Africa.14  Since then the American influence in the world grew 
even more and came to meet the Americans expectations and predestination.  A predestination 
not only recognized by George W. Bush (“our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our 
Nation’s defense.”15) but also countless times before, by many other American Presidents.  
Thomas Jefferson predicted an “empire of liberty,” Hamilton envisioned an America “majestic, 
efficient, and operative of great things.”16   
Today’s American way is different from the beginning of the 19th Century.  Although 
they are still idealists since they continue to believe in the same core democratic values that 
appear in the American Constitution.  They are no different from Woodrow Wilson when he 
fought the “war to end all wars.”17  They still seek to “champion aspirations for human 
dignity,”18 or defend the world from evil, guarantee “economic growth through free markets and 
free trade.”19  Yet, because history did not give America a chance of learning a different way of 
defending these beliefs, as it gave to Europe, American foreign policies often collide with other 
nations, institutions or ideologies.   
3. The European Identity 
With a different historical trajectory, Europeans went from defenders of power politics to 
defenders of institutionalism and multilateralism.  Religion also had a significant influence in the 
European history.  A good example of that were the so-called “Christian Crusades,”20 the 
Western European military expeditions and conflicts waged internally and externally in Europe 
against non-Christians.  These Crusades took place not only to recover Christian territory from 
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the Muslims in the Middle East, but also to expand the religious and political power.  Europeans 
often recurred to weapons and war to achieve their political, religious or economical goals.  For 
centuries, Europe was a battlefield, the place where successive emperors fought their wars.  The 
last century in particular was a brutal and violent one.  WWI devastated Germany, Russia and 
Austria-Hungary, three of the five most powerful states in Europe since the German unification 
in 1871.21  It also left France and Great Britain in a weak position, financially strapped, highly 
dependent on America, without the power and the political will to create an effective collective 
security through the League of Nations.  On top of that, in between the Great Wars, England, 
France and other European countries had to fight their own colonial wars.22  England and France 
gave up the collective security strategy, the appeasement with Adolf Hitler did not work and 
Europe came to have a destructive WWII.  Its outcome, together with all the brutal human and 
material destruction, was a retrenchment of European global influence.23  Europe had no 
financial or political capacity to project sufficient force to maintain its colonies.  It went from a 
leading position in the 19th century to a very dependent one in the 20th century.  Just as 
Americans had done before WWI, this time, European leaders were the ones searching for a 
system that would prevent another major confrontation in Europe.  
 After WWII, in an American manner, the Europeans quested for effective 
multilateralism in order to develop a stronger international society, based on well-functioning 
international institutions.24  On May 9, 1950, in Paris, the French Foreign Minister Robert 
Shuman, in order to prevent another war between France and Germany, would invite them and 
other European countries as well, to bring together their coal and steel production.  This step was 
“the first concrete foundation of a European federation”25 and started a system of governance 
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where sovereignty would be shared and where economical development and economic 
interdependency would mutually prevent confrontation between the European countries.26   
After WWII, while America initiated a path to consolidate her ideology worldwide and to 
fulfill her destiny - many times using war to do so – Europe moved further away from power 
politics and became self-absorbed in its own problems.  The idea of solving problems by using 
the military became absurd for the traumatized European people.  Europe, once powerful and 
belligerent became weak and skeptic of war.  It became a defender of soft power, institutions and 
diplomacy to solve problems.  It became a defender of war as a last resort, used only after 
international institutions, diplomacy and peaceful solutions, all failed.  Ironically, Europe found 
itself at the point where America was in the beginning of the 20th century.   
4. The Allie’s Differences and Similarities 
Although Europe and America essentially share the same fundamental beliefs, the ideas 
about promoting sustainable development, advancing human rights and of global economic 
growth and integration, their strategy to secure their international interests is recognizably 
different.  These diverging strategic behaviors reveal how Americans and Europeans have 
different cultures.  Culture can be defined as “the relatively stable set of inner values and beliefs 
generally held by groups of people in countries or regions and the noticeable impact those values 
and beliefs have on the peoples’ outward behaviors and environment.”27  The major differences 
between Americans and Europeans are not on the values and beliefs, but on the people’s outward 
behaviors.  Americans admire personal empowerment and individualism to control their own 
destiny, more so than Europeans do.  Proof of that is in the European welfare system, which is 
based on the state and not so much on individual responsibility.28  Americans believe that 
“dignity lies in morally redeeming work rather than in the social solidarity of a welfare state.”29   
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Americans are more religious than Europeans are.  According to the Pew Foundation, 
while less than a third of Germans, Italians, French and British are still considered religious, the 
majority of Americans consider the belief in God as a prerequisite to morality.30  Because of 
their history, both America and Western European countries are secular.  Although, while in 
western European countries, religion has a smaller influence in politics, in America it seems to 
be the opposite.  Successive American Administrations use it to influence the public in support 
of their policies.  Their actions are often justified by the sense of liberation from evil.  
Americans and Europeans have different national identities.  The Civil War and all the 
wars America fought abroad during the 20th century helped in the development of American 
nationalism.  During the Cold War, the American national identity was shaped by anti-
Communism.31  In relation to Europeans it is more correct to speak in supra-nationalism.  
Europeans moved away from the nationalism and out-of-control sovereignty responsible for 
WWI. 32 They find it difficult to define themselves in national terms.  They also find it difficult 
to define a European identity.  Since it is difficult for Europeans to describe themselves, they 
often define themselves as who they are not.  Especially since the war in Iraq, Europeans 
describe themselves as being non-Americans.33   
More than anything else, foreign policies are what differentiate the Allies.  A Times-
Mirror Center survey concluded that every three in four Western European countries pointed 
foreign policies as the source of friction, not values.34  It was in particular the case with the Bush 
Administration.  Pulling out of the Kyoto Treaty and refusing to sign the Nuclear Test ban Treaty 
are only two examples of unilateral policies.  Isolating the Guantanamo Bay prisoners away from 
the mainland not to have to treat them as prisoners of war, in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention and applying tariffs on imports from other countries, like the European steal 
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industry, are two other examples of policies that tend to separate more than unite the Allies.35  
Americans are quicker to the use of force to solve problems than Europeans are.  According to 
consistent surveys performed by the German Marshall Fund, 80% of Americans agreed that 
under certain conditions war is necessary to obtain justice, while less than a third of French, 
Germans, Italians or Spanish would agree with it.36  Americans also appear more comfortable 
with the idea of military preemption.37  The war in Iraq is a clear example.  While some Western 
European governments supported the war, the public in general was against it.38  The foreign 
policy against terrorism also splits the Allies.  Europeans have a large experience dealing with 
terrorism in its own territory.  England, Ireland and Spain together, had more than 5,000 deaths, 
due to terrorist acts in the last 30 years.39  It only became more noticeable after 9/11 and with the 
bomb attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and in London on July 7, 2005. 
Differences in interests, perceptions, experiences, or mere policies are often accompanied 
by splitting words on both sides of the Atlantic and do not bring anything positive to the 
Transatlantic Alliance.  Using ideology and religious references such as “you’re either with us or 
against us” and “axis of evil” is appealing and hardly accepted by some Europeans, where the 
memory of oppressive regimes full of messianic promises is still fresh.40  In the mist of a post 
Cold War and post 9/11 international order, the Allies seem to be drifting apart.  This growing 
split in the West becomes quite concerning in a time where the rising of global threats seem to 
threaten the normality of the western societies.  Whether it is a wrong perception or a cruel 
reality, this global insecurity environment seems to affect what best defines the West – its 




1. The effects of American Hegemony  
Because of its military, economic and political power, America is in fact a world 
hegemonic Nation.  For those who scarcely recognize this reality there are studies made since 
1880, in twenty-year intervals, that ranked the countries until present days.  They are based on 
numerous factors such as economic strength, population and percentage of GDP spent in the 
military.  In these, America appears in all top five positions.  Additionally, in the last years the 
gap between America and any other competitor increased considerably.41  There are other 
important and emerging powers in the world such as Europe, China, Japan, Russia and India - 
just to name a few - but they simply cannot match the American might.  Europe is economically 
very strong, although the lack of strategic unity among EU members prevents Europe from 
blooming and becoming a stronger global political player.  As long as Europe is absorbed by its 
own problems and its own agenda - the EU enlargement, the stability and growth pact, the social 
budget pressure driven by an aging population and immigration – European military and political 
power will take time to grow and compete with America.   
The American military is so strong that any other country cannot challenge it directly.  
“The fact that America possesses peerless global political clout makes it the focus of envy, 
resentment, and, for some, intense hatred.”42  Hegemony creates new possibilities and 
opportunities, although, just as Zbigniew Brzezinski argues in his book, “The Choice,”43 it also 
brings new responsibilities, threats and challenges.  Those who cannot challenge America 
directly are seeking other disruptive ways, trying to hurt the world leader.    
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2. The effects of Globalization, Economic Asymmetry and Political awareness.  
Geographical isolation, the end of the Cold War, the victory over communism, a 
technology driven revolution in military affairs, the chance of spreading a model of society thru 
the internet and modern communication systems, all served to emphasize the level of American’s 
hegemony.  With Globalization, the world seemed to shrink considerably.  It became accessible 
from a distance of a click.  Products became accessible from anywhere at anytime.  As the world 
seemed to shrink and be more within reach of a finger, the risks of one being able to influence 
another’s life grew at the same rate.  The revolution of new technologies accelerated the 
globalization process.  Globalization compressed time and distance in favor of the more 
developed countries.  Globalization promoted the economic abysm between North and South, 
between developed and undeveloped countries.  The information era that accompanied 
Globalization allowed a general increasing awareness or political consciousness among different 
civilizations.  It allowed the world to perceive the American hegemony but it also allowed the 
building of resentment against Americans.44   
This political awareness of all the differences between the West and other regions of the 
globe grows the roots that nationalists, ethnic or religious fundamentalists need to recruit among 
those in need.45  Brzezinski affirms that the world is now politically awakened to the inequality 
in the human condition.46  Globalization – due to the American superior capacity to project itself 
in the world – gained an American face.  Americans to the eyes of extremists soon became 
responsible for all the problems everywhere in the world.  America became the reason extremists 
needed to feed their cause.   
If modern technology allowed more power, and allowed America to reach further and 
faster, it also virtually eliminated the geographical isolation and in some cases became a source 
of threat to Americans.  When Brzezinski affirms technology is the great equalizer of societal 
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vulnerability, he is referring to the endless possibilities the new technologies bring to those 
intended to do evil.47  He is referring to the increased access to critical information thru the 
World Wide Web as well as to destructive means, kinetic or non-kinetic that those not adherent 
to law and respect for the human life - terrorist organizations, organized crime, ideological or 
religious extremist - can induce in modern day societies. After the end of the Cold War, the 
number of security concerns with global influence became enormous.    
3. The New Challenges and Threats to Global Security 
The problems the world faces today are not only terrorism, organized crime, weapons of 
mass destruction, regional conflicts or state failure: it is more complex than that.  It represents a 
complicated net of problems that creates a multiplying effect that flames the world security and 
peace.  This flaming effect is considered as global turmoil.48  It derives from a compound of 
problems, such as persistent mass poverty, social injustice, ethnic oppression, or religious 
fundamentalism.  Problems like these, very often become connected with each other forming a 
complex and dangerous web.  In an extreme or apocalyptic view, it is a matter of time before a 
group, an organization or a state is able to inflict a true technological advanced act of terrorism 
with unknown consequences.49 
Poverty paralyzes some regions in the world and creates the social conditions 
fundamentalists need to recruit terrorists, just like in Iraq.  In places like South Asia, as much as 
85% of the populace live with less then $2 per day.50  Close to 3 billion people, almost half of 
the world’s entire population is affected by poverty, living on less than $2 a day and every year 
45 million of those die due to hunger and poor nutrition.51  Poverty often relates with lack of 
education, illiteracy and lack of justice, factors that empower terrorist recruiters.  Poverty tends 
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to promote the will of mass migration.  It feeds ethnic hatred and the fight for survival, just like 
in Darfur, for example.   
Ethnic conflicts, such as the ones responsible for the conflicts in the Balkans in the 90s, 
continue to foster and create regional instability.  There are about 25 million Kurds between 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria seeking the recognition of the state of Kurdistan.  There are at least 
8 million people in Kashmir trying to survive under Pakistan and India’s pressure.  The 
Chechens are trying to survive Russia’s slow genocide.  4.5 million Palestinian Arabs are trying 
to survive the 5 million Israelis. 52 These are just some examples of regional conflicts based on 
ethnicity that can ignite instability in a specific region or have a multiplying turmoil effect.  
Regional conflicts normally persist in time, are violent, destroy human lives and they pass from 
generation to generation.  They often lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure, constituting a 
direct threat to fundamental freedoms and rights.53  Diseases like malaria or AIDS, consume 
states’ human and economical resources, creating more poverty, unemployment and instability.  
Failing states become a threat to neighboring States and a safe haven for breading of terrorist 
groups and organized crime.  The conflict over natural resources such as oil, gas and water tend 
to persist.  Water, essential for survival, is becoming scarce in some regions of the globe, like 
Africa and the Middle East and is perceived as a possible cause of regional conflicts. 
Demographic pressures from the overpopulated poor regions may also transform illegal 
immigration into more violent migrations.54  Side by side with mass migration is demographic 
congestion.  Together the population in India, Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh will increase 1.05 
Billion by 2050.  Such a factor alone raises the need for more resources, creating social pressure, 
poverty, unemployment and instability.  All these problems tend to breed ideological extremism, 
whether it is religious or political and gives way to terrorism.   
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The most noticeable of all the threats is terrorism.  It has different forms and ways of 
manifesting itself.  It does so through terror and violence, like 9/11 in New York, Madrid, 
London and endless times in the streets of Bagdad.  The direct effect can be the killing of 
thousands of people.  The indirect effects can be much worse.  Terrorism can disrupt the 
normality of a society or institution.  It can affect governments to the point that they react 
hotheaded and not in the best way.  The world changed after 9/11, not because of the direct result 
of the terrorist attacks but because the shock wave they created in the Allies politics, 
relationships and trust.  Terrorism aims to influence, to capture politically a particular 
government.55  When terrorist groups become associated with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), the stakes of danger become higher.  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
is by far the worst of all threats.  The advance of technology and biological sciences increases the 
element of risk to modern societies.56  Several threats contribute to this one, which might have 
the worst results of them all.  Briefly, the use of WMDs might be the result of terrorism 
committed to extreme violence.57  Their availability might result from organized crime and their 
production might happen under the auspices of a failing state.  The possibility of the combination 
of several of the previous factors is quite overwhelming and disturbing.   
In contrast with the Cold War period, some of these threats are hardly visible and 
recognizable.  To deal with them requires more than kinetic capacities.  They defy the military 
logic and their implications to the western societies are unpredictable and are still to reveal.  
They implications might vary from only some constrains in the life style, to a complete alteration 
of people’s behaviors in order to protect self.  
 14
AU/ACSC/ROMAO/AY08 
4. Implications for the West 
The effect of globalization combined with new challenges, such as global terrorism, had a 
determinant impact in the international community, in the transatlantic relationship and in the 
concepts of security and defense.  Different societies deal with terrorism in their own different 
way that among others derives from their grand politic, their history or their geography.  
American and European governments add a similar initial response to the 9/11 attacks.  The 
invocation of NATO Article 5, for the first time in the Alliance’s existence, only 24 hours after 
the terrorist attacks to the United States, was a clear signal that the North Atlantic Nations were 
individually and collectively bonded to whatever measures were to be taken against the 
terrorists.58  Although unity of effort was the first reaction to the attacks, soon after, in the pre-
Iraq War period, America and Europe started to drift apart, because of different identities, 
interests and experiences.  Only two weeks after NATO evoked Article 5, White House 
Officials, stated that the mission should determine the coalition, setting the tone for what came to 
be the post 9/11 doctrine.59  The difference in strategy was certainly the results of innumerous 
factors.  What is relevant for this argument is that, the aftermath result of 9/11 was a growing 
split between Europe and America.  If initially after 9/11 they were closer than ever, with time, 
the differences in strategy accentuated and they became further apart.  In the American 
Administration traditional way to present the problem to its people, in 2002, several countries 
were defined as belonging to the “axis of evil.”60  Europeans see it more as a political 
manifestation and less as a materialization of evil that tends to be less rational and more 
emotional.61  What is relevant is that the effects of 9/11 unveiled differences between Europeans 
and Americans that were developing since the end of the Cold War.  It also emphasized the 
doubts about the strategic importance of the Transatlantic Alliance.  In a time when the threats 
are diffuse and hard to pin point and eliminate, a deep cooperation between institutions and states 
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is required, in order to overcome them.  The dilemma is simple than, whether the nature of the 
threats is understood and nations cooperate among themselves to deal with them, or if they split 
apart they will become weaker and more vulnerable.   
America now duels between seeking its own security alone, in a unilateral way, or thru 
multi cooperation.  American history was developed under the idea that America was a holy 
place, a land of opportunity, with plenty of resources, protected by two oceans that always gave 
Americans a certain sense of sanctuary and purpose.  That sense of sanctuary disappeared with 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The decision of fighting terrorism in a unilateral way proved to be 
economically and politically expensive, ineffective and with unpredictable results.  Operation 
Iraqi Freedom is the undeniable example with a perplexing paradox.  Militarily, America was 
never so strong, politically, was never so weak.62  America is in a crossroad, has a strategic 
choice of its own to make, whether to persist in an isolationist policy, and continues defending its 
own ideology and interests in a different way from the European ones, or it decides to share 
decisions inside the international institutions it helped create.  The strategic solution that best 
defends the Allies, in the next century, is certainly the one that best preserves their core 
democratic values.  The values that define what the West in reality is.   
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Possible Solutions to Preserve the West 
The Allies need to find to a solution that best protects what the West represents, freedom, 
democracy and social prosperity.  It cannot be based on immediate strategies, short-term political 
views, but on higher principles for a slow but positive impact on the future.  It needs to serve the 
West’s interests and ideologies.  This chapter starts with the definition of the three criteria that 
will evaluate possible solutions: legitimacy, collective security and preservation of the western 
values.  It then analyzes them in three different hypothesis:  NATO replaced by ad hoc 
Coalitions, NATO replaced by a separate American and European military and NATO organized 
and prepared for the 21st Century.   
1. Evaluating Criteria 
The first criterion used to evaluate possible solutions is legitimacy.  Legitimacy is 
something based on recognized principles or accepted rules and standards63  and in accordance 
with the law or with established legal forms and requirements.64  It is generally accepted as 
legitimate that “a mandate from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) upholds and 
reproduces the international legal system”65 and “accords with a just cause, i.e., that the 
deliberation in the council reflects notions of justice and ethics.”66  When an institution or 
government perceives for whatever reason, the necessity of using the military instrument of 
power, it first seeks the legitimacy that will give it not only the legal and political support for its 
actions, but also the public support.  Because this support is important, states or institutions seek 
their actions to be viewed as legitimate, through diplomacy, via the UNSC or via a significant 
international support.  In Kosovo, where human rights were at stake and could not wait for a 
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UNSC resolution, the West intervention was considered legitimate since it embraced significant 
international support.  During the first Gulf War, in 1991, President Bush sought an approval 
from the UNSC even when under the UN Charter – Article 51 – it was not necessary, since 
Kuwait had requested assistance.  For this discussion, what is important is that states or 
Institutions like NATO recognize as fundamental the legitimacy given by the UN from where 
they drive the legal, political, or public support.   
The second selected evaluating criterion is collective security.  States promote collective 
security when they commit themselves to develop and enforce rules accepted by the international 
community and when their actions are legitimized by representative international organizations.  
NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) are three examples of institutions that fulfill the collective security role.  The 
North Atlantic community created NATO initially as a collective defense institution and after the 
end of the Cold War it developed the strategy and processes of a collective security institution.67 
The third evaluating criterion analyzes which solution best defends the preservation of 
western values as described in Chapter 1.  These values can be found in the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States Constitution,68 in the Treaty on the European Union,69 or in 
the first chapter of the UN Charter.70   
2. NATO Replaced by Ad Hoc Coalitions 
The war in Iraq presented the World with a crisis action formula based on a “coalition of 
the willing,” an ad hoc coalition that replaced the pluralism of an organization like NATO.  After 
the 9/11 attacks, while Europeans saw an opportunity for NATO to serve as a sign of unity and 
strength, Americans saw it as an obstacle for an effective response.  For Americans, the military 
clumsiness of the NATO members during the Balkans conflicts was still fresh in their memory.  
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If NATO was not able to support or defend American interests in the Middle East, then why 
should it exist at all?  For some American Officials it was time for a different arrangement in the 
Euro-American security relations.  This became evident in the Donald Rumsfeld formulation, 
“the mission should determine the coalition.”71  If the North Atlantic Coalition was not up to the 
moment, then another coalition would do it.  
The Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are two distinct case 
studies that reflect an Alliance based operation and an ad hoc coalition operation.  The 
international community fully supported OEF, which constitutes an example of a legitimate 
answer to a common enemy.  When the war in Afghanistan started, the large majority of 
Europeans, people and governments, were in support of the war against Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban regime,72 precisely because the situation was clear and presented no doubts.  OIF, the 
example of an ad hoc coalition, represents a different scenario.  The war in Iraq started in an 
international political turmoil.  On March 2003, while 70% of Americans were in support of 
President Bush’s decision to go after the Iraqi regime, as many Europeans were against that 
decision.73  Europeans did not see the war as the only way to deal with the Iraqi regime.  While 
OEF had an acquaintance effect, bringing the international society together around Americans, 
OIF had the exact opposite one.  Ad hoc coalitions do not rely on institutionalism since their 
purpose is to overcome the diplomatic or institutional drag.  They do not have the set up of a 
legitimate institution since they do not rely on the agreement of an international majority of 
countries represented by recognized institutions.  Ad hoc coalitions are contrary to the principle 
of collective security since they do not assure that states commit themselves to develop and 
enforce rules generally accepted by the international community.  Tactical and specific goals, 
more than ideology, drive ad hoc coalitions.  They are based on opportunities created by specific 
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interests and interpretation of security problems.  They are not organized around lasting common 
values.74  The Iraqi war did not result from a general perception of eminent threat to the 
international peace, or from an absolute necessity of prevention of such danger.  It resulted from 
a unilateral driven process without clear end states and objectives.     
3. NATO Replaced by a separate American and European Military 
Just as the embryonic European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 in Paris became a 
mature consolidated economic and social European reality, so will the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) become an inevitable reality.  Since there is no longer a Cold War, there 
is apparently no reason for Europe and America not to have their own separate and independent 
defense institutions.  Some believe it is time for Europeans to assume their own defense 
responsibilities and free America of that expensive burden. Security has been a top priority for 
America over the past decades.  Europeans, accustomed to having the American protection, seem 
to live in what Robert Kagan designates a “paradise.”75  A safe place protected by the powerful 
America that gives Europe time and an economical buffer to deal with her own institutional 
problems.  Others believe that with such a vast economy, representing a third of the world GDP, 
the EU is inevitably a global player.76  Politically speaking though, the EU is not yet in full 
bloom.  The natural path of such an economical colossus is to become also politically relevant 
and assume its responsibility in global security and in defending its values and beliefs.  It is true 
that the European project has been a slow process, but it also true that it has come a long way.  
When questioned about the EU, fifty years into the future, the majority of the Europeans see it as 
having an important role in diplomacy with its own military and an elected president.77  In order 
for that to happen and to see its political capacity match its economical one, Europe needs to 
consolidate its security and defense policy.  The relevant question is whether the ESDP will 
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serve the transatlantic link or if it will have an antagonistic effect, increasing the breach between 
Americans and Europeans.   
With the eruption of the Balkans conflicts in the 1990s, where more than 200,000 people 
died in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone and millions fled their homes to escape atrocities not seen 
since WWII, Europe awoke for the necessity of creation of mechanisms to prevent future 
crisis.78  In the advent of the world’s geopolitical turmoil succeeding 1989, the Maastricht 
Treaty, (Treaty on the EU), established in 1993, laid down the legal basis for a common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) and the progressive framing towards a common defense policy 
(ESDP).79  “The Monetary Union, CFSP and ESDP, and most obviously eastward expansion are 
unimaginable without this macro-political change of environment.”80  So far, the ESDP core 
missions have been humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and crisis 
management.  Since 2003, the ESDP went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Indonesia, Iraq and Georgia.81  It got involved in 11 different 
operations, including military and police missions, rule of law and civilian-military support 
missions.  With the western disarrangement provoked by the war in Iraq, Europe seems even 
more determined to fully develop its own military structure and rule its own future.  The purpose 
is not to transform the Union into a military alliance, but to equip it with the necessary 
instruments to become internationally credible and become able to defend the ideas and values it 
proclaims.82  No substantial results were met so far.  The distance between rhetoric and reality 
among the European members is significant.83  The EU has significant problems of its own, due 
to an economically demanding social welfare system.  With an ever-increasing elderly 
population, the tendency is for the welfare system to become even more expensive84 and the 
defense budget to become smaller.  The enlargement process encompasses new economical 
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challenges that take precedence over the ESDP.  With the possibility of ESDP becoming a 
reality, it needs to be confronted with the evaluating criteria.  ESDP, just as NATO, is set to be a 
legitimate security tool.  It belongs to the EU where liberal democracy, institutionalism and 
pluralism are a benchmark.  So far, the missions where the EU intervened were in accordance 
with the UNSC.  One must not forget that in this hypothesis, ESDP and the American 
Department of Defense would be operating separately.  In a situation with conflicting interests, 
some countries would side with Europeans, others with Americans.  The result would be a 
conflict of interests.  The ESDP could fit the frame of a collective security institution, but 
because of its limited operational capacity, it is not ready to assume that role yet.  Using NATO’s 
example with almost 60 years of existence and only a few organic assets, such as the AWACS 
and the Air Operations Centers (AOC’s), it is foreseeable that the ESDP will not have its own 
forces or structures anywhere soon.  This means that the European capacity to execute any major 
operation in the world, for the sake of collective security is for the moment highly unlikely. 
In a first analysis, ESDP fulfills the role of preserving the western values, although the 
reality might be quite different.  Because it is a separate institution from the transatlantic 
alliance, it might become conflicting with the American interests and more than a bridging tool it 
might work as a dividing one.  Several American officials point to the fact that Europe does not 
do enough to share the international security burden, while others have concerns about an 
independent European security capacity.  On the European side, the concerns are identical.  
“ESDP adds nothing to military capabilities.  It should be seen for what it is -- part of the process 
of European political integration, intruding into the most sensitive areas of national sovereignty, 
undermining NATO and widening the gap between the U.S. and Europe.”85  For many, Europe 
continues to be strategic for American interests.  If Europe would become self sufficient in 
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defense, then the American forces in Europe would have to retreat from Europe.  Withdrawing 
forces from Europe would signify an entrenchment in the world influence, a bad example to 
other regions in the world, something America is not prepared to do yet.    
More concerning is the fact that an ESDP separated from NATO would mean that the 
forum of decision that NATO provides would no longer be available to filter interests and protect 
higher values.  A split in the West is something desired by terrorists.  It would mean less unity to 
fight a common threat and address the global turmoil issues.    
4. The 21st Century NATO 
NATO is a well-organized, mature institution that has been able to survive different 
challenges since 1949 and has defended what the west holds as most precious – freedom.  In a 
world that is in continuous change, NATO reacts and tries to adapt.  Between the American 
hegemony and the European military self-determination, NATO seeks to remain relevant.  As 
today’s challenges change in an era of information and globalization, NATO searches for a new 
strategic concept trying to remain as relevant as during the Cold War.  As the Allies, separated 
by more than the Atlantic Ocean, grow different from one another due to their history, 
geography, interests or identities, it is required to evaluate if NATO remains a collective security 
institution and if it remains a legitimate Institution.  At the end, it is even more important to 
understand what the West needs to do with NATO in this 21st century, to keep it as a tool to 
preserve the western values.  
NATO is a collective security, political and military organization of 26 members.  States 
that share democracy, freedom, rule of law, solidarity, individual liberty, well being, peace, 
stability and common heritage as core values.86  Through Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
NATO initially established the principle of collective defense, meaning that an armed attack 
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against one or more members was an attack against all of them.  In Reykjavik, May 2002, NATO 
members’ foreign ministers decided that it would operate when and where required to fight 
terrorism.  They decided that NATO would have no more geographic limitations.87  NATO 
evolved to a broad definition of security, reaching not only to the military aspects of security but 
also to the political, economic, social and environmental ones.88  It is viewed as a unique 
collective security partnership and forum for strategic security discussion, maintaining the link 
between North America and Europe.   
Since its beginning, NATO derives its legitimacy from all its members and from its 
connection to the UN Charter.  NATO’s adaptation to the post Cold War and post 9/11 
challenges, also called transformation, is well under way.  A series of adaptations and 
adjustments took place between 1991, when NATO first published its strategic concept and the 
Riga Summit in 2006, when NATO presented its framework for the next 10 to 15 years.  In 
addition, since its creation in April 1949, NATO has had five enlargements.  From twelve 
founding members, NATO grew to 26.  It might continue to grow as Albania, Croatia and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia aspire to become the next partner countries.89  Georgia 
and Ukraine are also performing important reforms looking for an opportunity to become NATO 
members.90 If NATO has evolved and adapted to such an unpredictable world in such a coherent 
manner, then why are there so many doubts about its relevance?  What needs to be done to 
prepare NATO for the 21st century challenges?  The answer to this question explains why NATO 
is an Alliance of values and why an Alliance created almost 60 years ago is more relevant today 




Today’s threats can only be addressed with a marriage of convenience between what 
seems to be a pluralist Europe and a unilateral America.91  The western Leaders must understand 
the nature of today’s threats and the context they emerge from, as presented in chapter two.  
They need to foresee the consequences if these challenges are not addressed in a unified political 
manner.  As the Iraqi war demonstrates, American power is quite significant but even though 
might not be able to do everything on its own.  Terrorism driven from fundamentalism requires 
international cooperation to achieve information superiority, requires addressing the true 
economic reasons underneath the problem and a diplomatic commitment driven from an 
international political community.  Any attempt to address such a vast problem needs a broad 
and strategic consensus regarding a long-term solution and not a unilateral, short-term one.  The 
Allies must perceive that the threat is not local or regional but global.  The response needs to be 
determined, gradual, and global.  Since it is a global threat, NATO needs to go global too.  
A global NATO is the result of global cooperation between states that share common 
values and it is the solution to control global turmoil.  America and Europe, representing almost 
1 billion people, constitute the nucleus in this global cooperation or global community of shared 
interests.  “A global community of shared interests, on the other hand, is not only possible and 
desirable but actually emerging.”92  It is the spontaneous result of the advance of globalization 
and democracy and represents the natural evolution of interstate relations towards an informal 
global community of shared values.93  NATO’s ongoing cooperation with Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand and the Republic of South Korea, is an example of an expanding global community of 
shared interests.94  
The western Leaders must understand the European Union project is moving towards its 
own military and defense capacity and that it is inevitable for the sake of Europe’s own internal 
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security and stability.  The European defense pillar will mirror the political process and will take 
a long time, but eventually will be a reality.  Instead of fighting against an autonomous ESDP, 
both Americans and Europeans need to accept it and use it in the global NATO concept.  
Because the Allies have different strengths, due to their different geography, history, 
nationalism/ethnicity, development, religion and interests, their particular capacities need to be 
correctly used.  Europeans seem more experienced in nation building and peacekeeping 
missions.  Due to their colonial experience in Africa, Europeans seem to be more suited to 
operate there.  Americans, with a much more developed, technological advanced and capable 
military power, are more qualified to deter threats, prevent or terminate conflicts, when and 
where necessary.   
A perfect political synchronized NATO might seem a utopian idea.  History had the 
opportunity to show that Woodrow Wilson’s vision of creating the League of Nations was not 
utopian.  Had the Americans adhere to it and the Europeans been strong enough to believe in it, 
the world would probably be a safer place today.  It is a matter of choice for both Americans and 
Europeans.  Are Americans willing to give up some of their hegemony towards a truly global 
collective security?  Are Europeans willing to alter their Stability and Growth Pact and give up 
some of their economical prominence in order to defend collectively the western values?  It is a 
matter of choice between a true political commitment and a political and ideological isolation.   
Significant changes need to occur in NATO’s commanding framework in order to 
accommodate a more independent Europe and an America willing to share part of its NATO 
institutional control with the European members.  In today’s NATO, Europe is more an 
appendage rather than a European pillar.95  America controls NATO and still has a large degree 
of freedom of action outside the Alliance.96  In the 21st century NATO, Europe needs to assume 
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its full political and economic responsibilities and America needs to compromise its freedom of 
action towards effective institutionalism, in favor of global leadership rather than global 
governance.  The world needs an America and a Europe truly interdependent with their security 
irrevocably linked, operating in cooperation with other democratic nations, when and where the 
global security requires.   
“A strategic tipping point is at hand and for all its many contradictions NATO, as the West’s 
only truly strategic organization, remains the West’s best hope for generating strategic effect in 





As this paper presented, NATO is the indispensable Alliance to the preservation of the 
western values.  It is a tool capable of uniting American and European interests and identities 
and without it, the West will grow weaker in today’s global turmoil.  
The first chapter described Americans and Europeans values and beliefs.  It showed that 
Americans and Europeans are somehow different, although their cultural foundations are based 
on the same core democratic values and beliefs.  Due to their different geography, history, 
nationalism/ethnicity, development and religion, they came to develop different external 
behaviors.  Americans believe in exceptionalism and religious predestination.  They still seek to 
“champion aspirations for human dignity,”98 or defend the world from evil, guarantee “economic 
growth through free markets and free trade.”99  Yet, because history did not give America a 
chance of learning a different way of defending these beliefs, as it gave to Europe, American 
foreign policies often collide with other nations, institutions and/or ideologies.  Europeans, 
motivated by their history of war and violence moved from power politics to institutionalism and 
multilateralism.  As chapter one demonstrated, more than values, policies is what most divides 
the West.  This is especially noticeable in the way their leaders pursue their different strategies 
for the same problems.   
The second chapter presented the security dilemma the world is facing today, which is 
the result of not only new threats and challenges but also the result of splitting western strategies.  
The chapter started with a reference to the American hegemony.  Globalization, the victory over 
communism, a technology driven revolution in military affairs, the chance of spreading a model 
of society thru the internet and modern communication systems, all served to emphasize the level 
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of America’s hegemony.  It also allowed the rise of political awareness, envy and resentment 
against the West.  With this political awareness, of all the differences between the West and 
other regions of the globe, grows the roots that nationalists, ethnic or religious fundamentalists 
need to foster their causes.  The global turmoil the world faces today, comes from a complicated 
net of problems that feed one another and creates an exponential effect.  It is a compound of 
problems, such as persistent mass poverty, social injustice, ethnic oppression, religious 
fundamentalism, terrorism, and organized crime, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts 
or state failure.  As chapter two demonstrates, the global turmoil and the end of total security, the 
possibility of weapons of mass destruction being used with catastrophic consequences, all have 
implications to the West that are twofold.  First, they may have a direct influence on the western 
societies, inducing changes that go from small adjustments to complete alteration of people’s 
habits.  Secondly, they may have an indirect influence on the West, by creating divergences 
between the Allies policies, creating tensions and divisions that lead to a lack of unity.    
The third and last chapter evaluated three different solutions to solve the security 
dilemma and defend the preservation of the western values.  It used legitimacy, collective 
defense and preservation of the western values as evaluating factors.  At the end, it advanced 
with some conclusions and recommendations for the West to be prepared for the 21st Century.  
The first evaluated solution was the creation of ad hoc coalitions, every time a security problem 
appears.  Such solutions are not legitimate since they do not rely on international recognized and 
generally accepted institutions, such as the UNSC.  It proved not to be the best way of defending 
collective security since Nations do not commit themselves to develop and enforce rules 
generally accepted by the international community.  It also proved not to be the best way to 
preserve the western values, just as it happened during OIF, leaving the Allies in a weaker 
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political position.  The second solution evaluated was NATO being replaced by a completely 
separate European and American Military defense structure.  A complete separation between 
western military institutions, more than serving the West would hurt the preservation of its 
values.  This solution also proved neither to be legitimate nor to defend collective security.  An 
ESDP separated from NATO would mean that the forum of decision that NATO provides would 
no longer be available to filter interests and protect higher values.  It would mean less unity to 
fight a common threat and address the global turmoil issues.    
At the end, this chapter concludes and recommends what the West needs to do in order to 
prepare NATO for the 21st century and guarantee the preservation of the western values.  It 
establishes that in order to face today’s threats, a marriage of convenience, is required, between 
what seems to be a multilateral Europe and a unilateralist America.  In the 21st century NATO, 
Europe needs to assume its full political and economic responsibilities and America needs to 
compromise its freedom of action towards effective institutionalism, in favor of global leadership 
rather than global governance.  Only combining efforts first can the West address global 
insecurity.  Then, since the threat became global, NATO needs to become global too.  A global 
NATO would be the result of global cooperation between states that share common values and 
would be a proper solution to control the global turmoil.   
“NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is 
permanently tied to the security of Europe.  It is the practical expression of effective collective 
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